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Abstract 
This article explores how the death of Osama bin Laden was narrated by the Obama Administration between the 
night of his killing and the 2012 State of the Union address. Three aspects of this unfolding story, in particular, 
are explored: i) Descriptions of the operation itself; ii) Constructions of bin Laden’s life and character; and, iii) 
Accounts of the significance and likely consequences of his killing. The article argues that the narration of these 
events was characterised, first, by considerable discursive continuity with the war on terrorism discourse of 
George W. Bush. And, second, by a gradual removal or ‘forgetting’ of bin Laden and the circumstances of his 
death. Each of these dynamics, we argue, contributed to the legitimisation of his killing, demonstrating the 
importance of narrative remembrance and forgetting alike for the conduct and justification of liberal violence. 
Key words: Forgetting; Memory; Narrative; Osama bin Laden; Barack Obama; War on Terror 
 
Introduction 
This article explores how Barack Obama’s Administration narrated the killing of Osama bin 
Laden in a US Special Forces mission in Pakistan on 2 May 2011. Employing a discourse 
analytic approach,1  the article focuses, specifically, on three dimensions of the storying of 
this event within elite political discourse: (i) descriptions of the operation that ended in bin 
Laden’s death; (ii) accounts of bin Laden’s life and character; and, (iii) evaluations of his 
killing’s significance. The article makes two primary observations. First, that the narration of 
bin Laden’s killing demonstrated considerable discursive continuity with the ‘war on 
terrorism’ discourse of the George W. Bush administration. As demonstrated below, 
numerous recognisable themes from that paradigm returned throughout each of our three 
dimensions, despite Obama’s apparent abandonment of this discursive framework.2 The 
article’s second observation is that the writing of this event was also characterised by a 
gradual removal or ‘forgetting’ of bin Laden the man, and the circumstances of his death. 
This took place, first, via a stylistic shift toward ‘cleaner’ language and metaphorical 
description. And, second, through an increasing focus on the consequences - rather than the 
fact and details - of his death for the US and its constituent publics. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 As discussed below, this approach is inspired by post-positivist theorists of discourse working within 
International Relations (IR) and beyond. See, for instance, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States 
Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edn. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); see 
also Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, ‘Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive 
Construction of “The Cuban Problem”, 1960-1994’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25 no.2 
(1996): 361-398; Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London, 
Routledge, 2006); Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Loud Voices Behind the Wall: Gender Violence and the Violent 
Reproduction of the International’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 no.2 (2006): 377-401. 
2 Richard Jackson, ‘Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism 
policy from Bush to Obama’, International Politics, 48, no. 2/3 (2011): 390-411; Michelle Bentley ‘Continuity 
we can Believe in’ in Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland, eds. Obama’s Foreign Policy: Ending the War on 
Terror (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Adam Hodges, The War on Terror Narrative: Discourse and 
Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality, (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
!The article’s primary argument is that these dynamics of discursive continuity (with the Bush 
administration) and discontinuity (within the administration’s (re)telling of this story) are 
intimately connected. Each, we argue, contributed to the legitimisation of the assassination of 
bin Laden. In the former, this took place via a return to the war on terror’s ethical certainties, 
especially in constructions of terrorism, heroism, cowardice, and justice. In the latter, it 
occurred via a gradual de-emphasising of the administration’s responsibility for bin Laden’s 
death, and the legal and moral questions integral to this use of lethal force. This gradual 
effacement, we argue, evidences the centrality of narrative forgetting3 – as much as 
remembrance – to the organisation and routinisation of particular types of violence. 
In making these arguments, this article seeks to contribute to three distinct literatures. The 
first is the wealth of contemporary studies exploring terrorism’s discursive and performative 
productions. Heterogeneities notwithstanding, this work offers an important contribution to 
recent critiques of terrorism research and the ostensible surety of this sub-field’s conceptual 
and normative foundations.4 Richard Jackson’s Writing the War on Terrorism remains the 
fullest example here, in which the construction of events (9/11), identities (terrorists and 
Americans), threats (terrorism) and ethics (around the war on terror) are traced across the 
language of the Bush Administration’s war on terror.5 For the purposes of this article, this 
literature is significant because of the scepticism it fosters toward the rubric of ‘terrorism’ 
and its apparent ontological stability. The broadly constructivist framework shared by much 
(though not all) of this work, means (counter-)terrorism can be approached - as in this article 
- not as an extra-discursive reality to be discovered or known. Rather, as a “social 
construction, hence a social fact produced in discourse”.6 This facilitates the asking of 
radically different research questions, not least: how is ‘terrorism’ produced discursively, and 
what do (re)productions of ‘terrorism’ do socially and politically? Anchoring this rethinking 
of terrorism research and its purpose, therefore, is an appeal that scholars, “focus on the 
discourse by which the terrorist actor and his or her actions are constituted”.7 
Second, as constructions of (counter-)terrorism have stimulated a vast contemporary 
literature within IR and beyond, so too have practices, technologies and objects of 
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3 Uri Ram, ‘Ways of Forgetting: Israel and the Obliterated Memory of the Palestinian Nakba’, Journal of 
Historical Sociology 22, no. 3 (2009): 366-395. 
4 Jeroen Gunning, ‘A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?’, Government and Opposition, 42 no. 3 (2007): 363–
93; Richard Jackson, Marie Breen-Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds. Critical Terrorism Studies: A New 
Research Agenda, (London: Routledge, 2009); Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen-
Smyth, eds. Terrorism: A Critical Introduction. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011); Lee Jarvis, ‘The Spaces and 
Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies’, Security Dialogue, 40 no. 1 (2009): 5–27. 
5 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005); see also: Sandra Silberstein, War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11, 
(London: Routledge, 2002); John Collins and Ross Glover, eds. Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to 
America’s New War. (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2002); Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and 
America’s War on Terror, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); James Brassett, ‘Cosmopolitanism 
vs. Terrorism? Discourses of Ethical Possibility Before and After 7/7’, Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies, 36 no.2 (2008): 311-338; Jack Holland, Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses after 
9/11, (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
6 Rainer Hülsse, and Alexander Spencer, ‘The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist 
Turn’, Security Dialogue 39 no.6 (2008): 571-592, at 572. 
7 Ibid.  
!remembrance.8 Although not without criticism,9 contributions to this ‘memory boom’10 have 
been integral in developing understanding of memory’s association with core features of the 
social, such as the ways in which collective identities are negotiated.11 Much of this research 
draws inspiration from Halbwachs’ pioneering efforts to rethink memory as a fundamentally 
social phenomenon: one that is created and organised around dynamic, and incomplete, social 
and interpretive frameworks.12 Approached thus, memory is viewed not as a ‘thing’ but as a 
process13 in which the past is, “constantly selected, filtered and restructured in terms set by 
the questions and necessities of the present”.14 This continuous and selective engagement with 
the past is precisely the space wherein social actors exercise agency through their rewriting 
and reinventing of that which has taken place. This is done not only in the context of 
concerns about the present and future.15 But, in addition, through the interplay of 
remembrance and its ostensible antithesis, forgetting, about which far less has been written.16 
The final literature to which this article contributes concerns the role and significance of 
discourse(s) within IR. Although we focus primarily on the use of language, our analysis 
follows those - inspired by Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, in particular - for whom the 
social and discursive are coterminous.17 This scholarship’s importance is in its detailing of 
the ceaseless and contested dynamics through which meaning is imposed on the social world, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 For scholarship on memory rooted within IR concerns, see Duncan Bell, ‘Introduction - Violence and 
Memory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38 no.2 (2009): 361-377; Maja Zehfuss, ‘Hierarchies of 
Grief and the Possibility of War: Remembering UK Fatalities in Iraq’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 38 no.2 (2009): 419-440;  Lee Jarvis, ‘Remember, Remember, 11 September: Memorialising 9/11 on the 
Internet’, Journal of War and Culture Studies, 3 no.1 (2010): 69–82. 
9 For example, Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse”, Representations, 69 
(2000): 127-150; Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish 
Suffering, (2nd ed.) (London: Verso, 2003); David Berliner, “The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the 
Memory Boom in Anthropology”, Anthropological Quarterly 78 no.1 (2005): 197-211. 
10 Jay Winter, “The Generation of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Contemporary Historical 
Studies”, German Historical Institute Bulletin 27 (2000): 69-92. 
11 See, amongst many others, Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, 
Representations 26 (1989): 7-24; Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Edited, Translated, and with an 
Introduction by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Maria Sturken, Tangled 
Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1997); Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From “Collective 
Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices”, Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998): 105-140; 
Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory: The American Experience  (London: Bloomsbury, 1999); 
Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds. War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
12 See, Jay Winter. and Emmanuel Sivan. ‘Setting the Framework’, in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds, 
War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6–39, at 28. 
13 Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies: From “Collective Memory” to the Historical 
Sociology of Mnemonic Practices’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24 no.1 (1998): 105–40, at 101; Myrian 
Santos, ‘Memory and Narrative in Social Theory: The Contributions of Jacques Derrida and Walter Benjamin’, 
Time & Society, 10 no.2/3 (2001): 163–89, at 169. 
14 Paolo Jedlowski, ‘Memory and Sociology: Themes and Issues’, Time & Society, 10 no.1 (2001): 29–44, at 30. 
15 Olick and Robbins, ‘Social Memory Studies’, 128; Santos, ‘Memory and Narrative in Social Theory’; Robin 
Wagner-Pacifici and Barry Schwartz, ‘The Vietnam Veterans Memorial: Commemorating a Difficult Past’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 97 no.2 (1991): 376–420, at 379; Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics. 
16 We return to conceptions of forgetting in the article’s final section. 
17 See Eric Herring and Doug Stokes, ‘Critical realism and historical materialism as resources for critical 
terrorism studies’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4 no.1 (2011): 5-21, at 6-8. 
!albeit in temporary and (often) unstable form.18 Thus, our exploration of the narration of bin 
Laden’s death, and changes therein, seeks to follow this work in unpacking the constitution of 
subjects, objects and events in the (re)telling of this particular story. In so doing, it attempts 
to build on earlier studies of political discourse around, inter alia, national security,19 
recreational drugs,20  global climate politics,21 and nuclear strategy.22 And, in the process, to 
unpack the importance of absences that appear or emerge in the formulation of prominent and 
hegemonic narratives, in particular.23 
This article seeks to contribute to these literatures in three primary ways. First, its principal 
contribution is empirical, concentrating on bin Laden’s killing as an under-explored case 
study through which to investigate the discursive production of (counter-)terrorism, and the 
importance of dialectics of memory and forgetting therein. Second, it seeks a conjunctural 
contribution by approaching elite discourse on this event as an opportunity to consider the 
war on terror’s rhetorical as well as material longevity. And, third, the article makes a 
conceptual contribution, contributing to understandings of the legitimisation (and 
condemnation) of violence through tracing the significance of practices of forgetting within 
articulations of meaning in global political life. 
The article’s methodology employs a discourse analysis of over one hundred linguistic texts – 
speeches, interviews, and press briefings – produced within the White House, Department of 
Defense and US intelligence community. Inclusion in this corpus was limited by two criteria. 
First, the time of its creation, with our focus here on the eight months between bin Laden’s 
death and Obama’s January 2012 State of the Union address. This period, importantly, 
incorporated the tenth anniversary of the events of 11 September 2001. The second criterion 
was explicit or implicit reference to bin Laden, the circumstances of his death, or the 
consequences of his killing. Our analysis of these texts in the remainder of the article 
proceeds in four sections. These focus on narrative constructions of bin Laden’s death, life, 
and the consequences of his killing, respectively, before assessing the implications of 
narrative forgetting for this case study and beyond.  
 
Killing bin Laden 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For an excellent overview, see Jacob Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges’, 
in Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, eds David Howarth and Jacob 
Torfing (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 1-32. 
19 Campbell, Writing Security. 
20 Eva Herschinger, ‘‘Hell is the Other’: Conceptualising Hegemony and Identity through Discourse Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 41 no.1 (2012): 65-90. 
21 Chris Paul Methmann, ‘‘Climate Protection’ as Empty Signifier: A Discourse Theoretical Perspective on 
Climate Mainstreaming in World Politics’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39 no.2 (2010): 345-
372. 
22 Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society, 12 no. 4(1987): 687-718. 
23 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for helping us to clarify this.!
!When news of bin Laden’s killing first broke, the fate that had befallen him was articulated in 
primarily descriptive phrasing. He was, initially at least, either “dead”24 or “deceased”.25 
Amidst ongoing appeals for evidence of his ‘death’– encouraged, in part, by vacillation over 
the release of photographic evidence – this writing was often combined with explicit 
recognition of American agency. Bin Laden, for instance, “was killed by the assaulting 
force”;26 “we killed”27 him with “U.S. bullets”.28 In one prominent and forthright framing, he 
had been, simply, “eliminated”.29 While this language of death and killing persisted 
throughout following weeks, over time it was gradually, but perceptibly, substituted with less 
strictly descriptive accounts. Rather than killed, bin Laden had instead been “removed”;30 
“taken off the battlefield”31 and “off the streets”.32 “Brought down”33 or “took down”,34 he 
had been “got”,35 was “gone”,36 and, as such, “lost” as a figurehead for other terrorists.37 In 
other descriptions still, his death was erased altogether; the completion rather than 
consequences of the mission being here emphasised. This was achieved metaphorically – “the 
hunt for Osama bin Laden … ended successfully a few days ago”38 – and via reference to the 
“successful mission against Osama bin Laden” 39 or “the successful bin Laden raid”.40 Yet, 
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24 John Brennan, ‘Press Briefing‘, Briefing Room, 2 May 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/02/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-and-assistant-president-homela (all speeches 
accessed 20-22 March 2012). 
25 Jay Carney, ‘Press Briefing’, Briefing Room, 4 May 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-542011. 
26 Jay Carney, ‘Press Briefing‘, Briefing Room, 3 May 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/03/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-532011. 
27 Carney, ‘Press Briefing‘, 4 May 2011. Emphasis added. 
28 Senior Defense and Intelligence Officials, ‘DOD Background Briefing’, by Telephone on U.S. Operations 
Involving Osama Bin Laden, 2 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4818. 
29 Jay Carney, J. ‘Press Briefing‘, Briefing Room, 9 May 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/09/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-592011. 
30 Senior Administration Officials, ‘Background Conference Call to Preview the President's Plan for 
Implementing His Strategy to Draw Down Troops in Afghanistan’, 22 June 2011. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/background-conference-call-senior-administration-
officials-preview-presi. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Senior Intelligence Officials ‘Background Briefing on Intelligence Aspects of the U.S. Operation Involving 
Osama Bin Laden’, Pentagon, 7 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4820. 
33 Robert Gates, ‘Office of the Director of National Intelligence’, Virginia, 25 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1573. 
34 Leon Panetta, ‘9/11 Commemoration for Pentagon Personnel’, Pentagon Courtyard, 9 September 2011. 
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1607. 
35 Leon Panetta, ‘Swearing-In Ceremony Remarks’, Pentagon, 22 July 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1596. 
36 Barack Obama, ‘Address to the United Nations General Assembly’, United Nations, New York, 21 September 
2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/21/remarks-president-obama-address-
united-nations-general-assembly. 
37 Senior Defense and Intelligence Officials, ‘DOD Background Briefing‘, 2 May 2011.  
38 Jay Carney, ‘Press Gaggle aboard Air Force One en route El Paso, Texas’, 10 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/10/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-aboard-air-
force-one-en-route-el. 
39 Jay Carney, ‘Press Briefing‘, Briefing Room, 9 June 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/06/09/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-692011. 
!although bin Laden’s death became less explicitly invoked, his removal was portrayed as 
both appropriate – “Osama bin Laden is finally where he belongs”41 – and legitimate, in that 
he had finally “met his just end”.42 
 
Mission: Accomplished 
The fluidity within this (re)writing of bin Laden’s death was also apparent within 
representations of the operation itself. Indeed, this was explicitly discussed, and linked to the 
challenges of swiftly releasing information to the public which would inevitably later be 
“reviewed”, “updated” and “elaborated”.43 Gradually, however, a coherent narrative 
developed that focused, primarily, on the mission’s courageous prosecution. The “heroic 
actions”44 of the Special Operations forces, praised by the Vice President’s wife, were also 
acknowledged by the President: “I want to again recognize the heroes who carried out this 
incredibly dangerous mission”.45 In the words of the First Lady, the operation’s prosecutors 
were “a small group of brave men, dropped by helicopter, half a world away in the dead of 
night…into unknown danger inside the lair of the most sought after man in the world”.46 
Flying “into a foreign country at the dead of night” and undeterred by the compound’s “high 
walls” and “barbed wire”,47 this group of brave men were prepared “to follow bin Laden 
to…hell’s gate if necessary”.48 Having made one of the “toughest”, “most courageous” 49 and 
“gutsiest calls of any President in recent memory”,50 their collective bravery was portrayed as 
reflective of a courage that stretched all the way up to the president. 
A second explanation for the mission’s success, in this emerging narrative, concerned its 
protagonists’ professionalism. The Special Forces received particular praise for their 
“stunning display”51, of “precision and skill” seen by the “entire world”.52 Likewise, the 
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40 Josh Earnest, J. ‘Press Gaggle Aboard Air Force One en route Pittsburgh, PA’, 11 September 2011. Available 
at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/11/gaggle-principal-deputy-press-secretary-josh-
earnest-aboard-air-force-on.  
41 Robert Gates, ‘United States Naval Academy Commencement’, Annapolis, Maryland, 27 May 2011. 
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1574. 
42 Panetta, ‘9/11 Commemoration’, 9 September 2011.  
43 Carney, ‘Press Briefing‘, 3 May 2011.  
44 Jill Biden, ‘Remarks at Mother's Day Tea for Military Spouses’, East Room, 6 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/06/remarks-first-lady-and-dr-biden-mothers-day-tea-
military-spouses. 
45 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks at Congressional Bipartisan Dinner’, East Room, 2 May 2011, Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-congressional-bipartisan-dinner. 
46 Michelle Obama, ‘Remarks at University of Northern Iowa Commencement’ Cedar Falls, Iowa, 7 May 2011. 
Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/07/remarks-first-lady-michelle-obama-
university-northern-iowa-commencement. 
47 Brennan, ‘Press Briefing’, 2 May 2011. 
48 Joe Biden, ‘Remarks at the Pentagon 9/11 10th Anniversary Commemoration’, Pentagon, 11 September 2011. 
Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/11/remarks-vice-president-biden-pentagon-
911-10th-anniversary-commemoration. 
49 Leon Panetta, ‘9/11 Tenth Anniversary Summit’, Newseum, Washington, D.C., 8 September 2011. Available 
at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1606. 
50 Brennan, ‘Press Briefing’, 2 May 2011.  
51 Leon Panetta, ‘DIA 50th Anniversary Ceremony‘, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C., 29 September 2011. 
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1615. 
!CIA’s “relentless” decade-long “hunt for Osama bin Laden”53 was applauded for the 
“painstaking work”54 that had made it a “classic and historic intelligence success”.55 The 
mission’s success was held up as “a model of seamless [inter-agency] collaboration”;56 a 
“staggering undertaking” that left the Vice President in “absolute awe” 57 and would provide 
a valuable “model for future operations”.58 As Obama noted, beyond its principal aim, it also 
resulted in the successful seizure of a “treasure trove of information”, constituting “the single 
largest collection of senior terrorist materials ever”, including several “golden nuggets of 
information on communications within the al Qaeda group”.59 For the Obama Administration, 
this haul served to “further confirm how important it was to go after Bin Laden”.60  
A third explanation of the mission’s success focused on the reinvigorated pursuit of bin 
Laden following Obama’s election.  White House Press Secretary Jay Carney noted his 
determination “to refocus … attention on that region” and “on al Qaeda” in a “very carefully 
deliberated … plan … for Afghanistan”, of which “getting bin Laden was very much a 
part”.61 As the President and Vice President recounted, respectively, “the killing or capture of 
Osama bin Laden” was elevated to “the top priority in our war to defeat al Qaeda”;62  “the 
number one priority was to get Osama bin Laden”.63 Narrated thus, this constituted a 
significant departure from the previous administration’s assumption that bin Laden, “could 
never be found”;64 reversing, as such, Bush’s shifting focus “from al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
and bin Laden onto Iraq”.65  Thus, where the narrativisation of the Abbottabad operation 
drew heavily upon the ‘war on terror’ discourse of Obama’s predecessor – revitalising the 
trope of ‘heroism’ and scripting the US as a resolute actor – it also served to introduce 
distance between the Bush and Obama administrations.  
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52 Leon Panetta, ‘SOCOM Change of Command‘, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, 8 August 2011. 
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1600. 
53 Senior Defense and Intelligence Officials, ‘DOD Background Briefing‘, 2 May 2011. 
54 Panetta, ‘9/11 Tenth Anniversary Summit’, 8 September 2011. 
55 Senior Intelligence Officials, ‘Background Briefing at the Pentagon on Intelligence Aspects of the U.S. 
Operation Involving Osama Bin Laden’, 7 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4820. 
56 Leon Panetta, ‘On the Record Statement’, 7 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4820 
57 Joe Biden, ‘Remarks at the Atlantic Council's 50th Anniversary Dinner’, The Ritz Carlton Washington, D.C., 
2 May 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/04/remarks-vice-president-
atlantic-councils-50th-anniversary-dinner. 
58 Robert Gates, ‘Office of the Director of National Intelligence’, Virginia, 25 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1573. 
59 Senior Intelligence Officials ‘Background Briefing’, 7 May 2011. 
60 Panetta, ‘On the Record Statement’, 7 May 2011.  
61 Carney, ‘Press Briefing‘, 3 May 2011. 
62 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks to the Intelligence Community at CIA Headquarters’, Langley, Virginia, 20 May 
2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/20/remarks-president-cia-director-
leon-panetta-and-dni-director-james-clapp. 
63 Joe Biden, ‘Remarks to the Troops at Fort Campbell, Kentucky’, 6 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/06/remarks-president-and-vice-president-troops-fort-
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!Mission: Legitimate 
Beyond reflecting on the mission’s success, the Obama Administration also repeatedly 
emphasised its legitimacy. The language of justice was particularly frequent here, featuring 
from Obama’s very first announcement of bin Laden’s death: “on nights like this one, we can 
say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done”.66 
In the coming days, the President, First Lady, Defense Secretary and Press Secretary would 
all speak explicitly of “justice” being “brought” by American forces and “received” by a 
“deserving” victim in an “entirely appropriate” way.67 It was a language that, very explicitly, 
continued core discursive themes of Bush’s war on terrorism and its promises of frontier 
justice. As he had earlier stated, terrorists are “nothing but a bunch of cold blooded killers 
and that’s the way we’re going to treat them”;68 and “whether we bring our enemies to justice, 
or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done”.69 On 2 May 2011, the Obama 
Administration could argue this had finally been achieved. 
This depiction of the operation as a bringer of justice was complemented by other 
constructions of its legitimacy. First, precision in its execution was repeatedly emphasised in 
just war-inflected framings of “a targeted operation”, which took care to minimise “collateral 
damage”, 70 by avoiding “civilian casualties”71 and striving “to protect … noncombatants.”72 
Within initial writings of the mission, this caution was even more noteworthy given the 
‘resistance’ encountered by US forces. As one official stated: “The American team engaged 
in a firefight…Osama bin Laden did resist”.73 The harm that befell some, in this writing, was 
an outcome only of their belligerence: “the woman who was shot in the leg physically 
assaulted the - or attempted to assault - or charged, rather, one of the U.S. assaulters”.74 
Second, the Administration stressed the considerable care and attention that was extended to 
the treatment of bin Laden’s body. Here, the requirements of Islamic tradition were 
repeatedly invoked: his corpse having been, “handled in accordance with Islamic practice”75 
and his burial performed in “strict conformance with Islamist precepts”.76 Detailed accounts 
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!of the burial were provided,77 contrasting “the respect that was shown to him and his body” 
with the “respect that Osama bin Laden showed to the victims on 9/11”.78 
Alongside justice, respect and precision, an additional writing of legitimacy emphasised the 
mission’s global backing. This took place via assertion – “people around the world are glad 
that he is gone”79 – and by the explicit naming of supporters: “numerous world leaders 
expressed their congratulations … Calderon … Cameron … Merkel … Netanyahu … Pinera 
… Santos, and … Sarkozy”.80 This roll call of international support was swiftly reciprocated, 
as allies, such as British Prime Minister David Cameron, congratulated the President 
mimetically: “This was not just a victory for justice, but a strike right at the heart of 
international terrorism”.81 Interestingly, these efforts to highlight the operation’s 
(international) legitimacy contrasted with the far sparser attention afforded its (international) 
legality. Where addressed directly, national security and the laws of war were, typically, 
invoked: 
 The operation was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war. ...There is simply no 
 question that this operation was lawful. Bin Laden was the head of al Qaeda, the organization that 
 conducted the attacks of September 11, 2001. And al Qaeda and bin Laden himself had continued to 
 plot attacks against the United States. We acted in the nation’s self-defence. ...Furthermore, consistent 
 with the laws of war, bin Laden’s surrender would have been accepted if feasible.82 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism, John Brennan, 
argued similarly four months later along two principal lines. There he noted, first, that the US 
was “engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida …[where] in accordance with international 
law—we have the authority to take action … without doing a separate self-defense analysis 
each time”.  And, second, that the United States “reserves the right to take unilateral action if 
or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions 
themselves”.83 Taken together, the Administration remained certain of the rightness of its 
operation, refusing to “apologize for the action that … this President took” as it was “simply 
beyond a doubt … that he had the right and the imperative to do this”.84 In Press Secretary 
Jay Carney’s words, the Administration felt “very strongly that the successful mission against 
a mass murderer of Americans and people around the world was entirely justified”.85 
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!The attention afforded the legitimacy of bin Laden’s killing was, perhaps, unsurprising. 
Although condemnation of the operation may not have been particularly widespread, serious 
concerns were articulated from several sources, not least in relation to the absence of legal 
processes, whether bin Laden was armed, and Pakistani sovereignty. In one critical view of 
the language of justice that so permeated this unfolding narrative, for instance: “the killing of 
an unarmed man is always going to leave a very uncomfortable feeling because it doesn't 
look as if justice is seen to be done, in those circumstances”.  Within this critique, “the 
different versions of events” that had emerged and evolved after the operation had “not done 
a great deal to help”, given how “important” it was “that justice [was] seen to be observed” in 
dealing with a “war criminal”.86 As this section has shown, the Obama Administration’s 
response to critiques such as these was multifaceted, drawing, frequently, upon the just war 
tradition prominent in the war on terror’s earlier writings.87 Thus, beyond straightforward 
designations of the actions as ‘just’, there was a repeated emphasis on presidential intent to 
‘get’ bin Laden, the international backing this enjoyed, and the operation’s careful precision. 
 
bin Laden, Osama, b. 1957, d. 2011 
As events leading to bin Laden’s death were being recounted, the Obama Administration also 
took the opportunity to revisit the man himself and his legacy, reawakening a number of the 
war on terror’s discursive themes in the process.88 The language of terrorism was 
unsurprisingly prominent here. For instance, bin Laden was “the leader of al Qaeda, and a 
terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and 
children”.89 He was, however, no ordinary terrorist, rather: “the most infamous terrorist of 
our time”;90 the “butcher”91 and “sworn enemy” 92 who “started this war”,93 and a continuing 
“danger to all humanity”.94 The writing of present threat was important, with bin Laden’s 
significance in this emergent obituary stretching far beyond responsibility for past violences. 
He was still, “the number one guy for al-Qaeda”;95 “an important symbolic figure”;96 and, 
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!“the only leader that al Qaeda had ever known”.97 Questions over his continued centrality to 
al Qaeda, moreover, were misplaced; here was an individual “actively involved in plotting 
operations and in directing the daily operations of the group...throwing operational ideas out 
there and...specifically directing other al Qaeda members”.98 Intelligence materials recovered 
in the raid offered sufficient evidence to confirm that “bin Laden remained an active leader in 
al Qaeda, providing strategic, operational and tactical instructions to the group”.99  And, 
although the unfolding ‘Arab Spring’ was invoked to evidence the anachronistic nature of bin 
Laden’s struggle, given that he “stood in direct opposition to what the greatest men and 
women throughout the Middle East and North Africa are risking their lives for”,100 this “relic 
of the past”101 still represented the active “leader of a violent extremist movement with 
affiliates across the globe”.102  
Bin Laden’s writing as a current, if anachronistic, threat was augmented in two principal 
ways, which both drew upon and reworked key themes in the war on terror discourse. First, 
the Obama Administration reaffirmed bin Laden’s contingent relationship to Islam. Carney, 
for example, reminded the media that this had “never been a war against Islam”,103 echoing 
the language of Cheney and others before him.104 Within this writing, bin Laden was “a mass 
murderer of Muslims”,105 who “offered a message of hate” and rejected “rights for Muslims 
in favour of violent extremism”106. Second, this discursive discrediting also made use of 
repeated constructions of cowardice and vanity, with bin Laden’s apparent withdrawal from 
the frontlines of conflict a prominent theme here. In the words of John Brennan, for instance, 
bin Laden’s “hiding” spoke to “the nature of the individual he was”.107 Bush’s earlier 
mocking of an enemy inclined to “hit and run” and then “hide in caves” was, in this way, 
reworked to account for bin Laden’s more recent cosseted lifestyle.108 The grand scale of his 
“$1 million” compound109 was, in the process, contrasted with the plight of those he directed 
to fight. Living “high on the hog”,110 bin Laden was obituarised as a proud, vain man, as 
evidenced by the video footage released after his capture. As one ‘Senior Intelligence Official’ 
noted, “he jealously guarded his image”: “you can see that his beard has been dyed 
black…[and the] video clip shows him watching his own images on television”.111 These 
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!revelations, it was hoped, showed an “alone and desperate” bin Laden, isolated from the 
“hardships” of “the fighters”, left “in a small room looking at a TV of pictures of himself”.112 
And, when fighting eventually arrived at his door, this ‘butcher’s’ cowardice was confirmed 
as he opted to hide, “behind women who were put in front of him as a shield”.113  
In sum, bin Laden’s obituarisation by Obama’s Administration clearly offered an opportunity 
for further condemnation of the man widely viewed as the war on terror’s instigator. Absent – 
or forgotten – here was any sustained reflection on the contexts or aims of his conflict with 
the United States. Politics only surfaced in expressions of the liberal demands deemed 
antithetic to bin Laden’s own struggle for which others across the Middle East and North 
Africa were now striving. Instead, he was demonised and discredited as a cowardly terrorist, 
reinforcing the writing of legitimacy into his killing (or disappearance) explored above. 
 
After bin Laden 
A third theme of particular - and increasing - concern in the Administration’s framing of bin 
Laden’s killing was its likely future significance.114 Four major consequences of his death 
were posited throughout the following months, each adding to the sense that we had 
witnessed an “historic and singular” event,115 of “incredible”, “extraordinary”,116 and 
“monumental” proportions.117 These concerned: al Qaeda’s future, (inter)national security, 
the US/Pakistan relationship, and the American national identity, respectively. 
First, on al Qaeda’s future, the Obama Administration framed the operation as “the most 
significant victory”118 and “greatest achievement”119 of the war on terror to date. This “major 
blow” not only concerned the removal of al Qaeda’s active leader, after a decade-long 
conflict. It also related to the impact of his death for would-be terrorists. As a Senior Defense 
Official noted, his killing “should send a signal” indicating “U.S. resolve” and “capability” to 
bring terrorists to “justice”.120 The operation would encourage “other al Qaeda leaders out 
there” to re-evaluate “their safety and security”.121 Thus, after “what occurred on Sunday”,122 
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!they “should be watching their back” because America would “finish the job”.123 Yet, as this 
framing implied, al Qaeda would likely outlive its figurehead. Although “the head off the 
snake” had been removed, “the body, while battered … is still there”.124  
Second, on US and global security, the Obama Administration emphasised that bin Laden’s 
demise increased the safety of Americans, thus rendering the world a “better place”.125 That 
Osama bin Laden would “never again threaten the United States of America” was a frequent 
feature of this unfolding narrative.126 Optimism, however, was moderately cautious, given 
that there were still “threats out there”.127 The ‘body of the snake’, in particular, presented the 
potential for “revenge attacks”128, with a need, therefore, for American “hyper-vigilance”.129 
As such, while the mission was a significant step toward American and global security, 
Americans and their allies should be “under no illusion that killing bin Laden removes the 
threat entirely”.130 In short, the US was “not done going after terrorists”.131 
Third, America’s relationship with Pakistan was also widely discussed due to two principal 
reasons: (i) the suspicion that Pakistan had been either “involved or incompetent”132 in bin 
Laden’s Abbottabad residence; and, (ii) the operation’s questionable legality given its 
conduct on Pakistani soil. The dominant portrayal of this relationship emphasised the 
mutuality of interests in the combating of al Qaeda. Carney, for instance, stressed the 
importance of the relationship for American “national security interests”.133 Continuing 
counter-terrorism cooperation was, however, also deemed important to Pakistan: “bin Laden 
is responsible for supporting operations that have killed scores of Pakistanis as well, so 
there’s a mutual interest in us working together”.134 And, as was frequently noted, “more 
terrorists have been killed on Pakistani soil than probably any other country”.135 The 
narration of this symbiotic relationship benefitted from invocation of historical and 
contemporary collaboration, whilst also acknowledging the challenges thereof in “a 
complicated relationship that is not perfect and that requires a lot of attention”.136 In this 
sense, although Pakistan presented “a steadfast partner … in some areas” of 
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!counterterrorism,137 difficulties in others ensured the Obama Administration would stay true 
to his predecessor’s approach of ‘unilateralism where necessary’:138 “working with the 
Pakistanis whenever we can, but also working on our own”.139  
Fourth, almost immediately, the killing was also inserted into the American historical 
narrative – “the story of our history”140 – as “a good day for America”141 and an “historic 
week in the life of our nation”142. For Carney, it represented a “great victory for the American 
people”.143 Irreducible to internal politicking or “partisan narrative”, this was an “American 
accomplishment.”144 As the President recounted in his State of the Union, party allegiances 
and personal ambitions “didn’t matter that day in the Situation Room, when I sat next to Bob 
Gates - man who was George Bush’s defense secretary – and Hillary Clinton – a woman who 
ran against me for president”.145 This moment of unity also reaffirmed the character of the 
American national identity. Like Bush before him, Obama insisted that US counter-terrorism 
operations served as a “reminder of what we’re about as a people”.146  And, almost inevitably, 
constructions of bin Laden’s killing both drew upon and reinforced notions of American 
exceptionalism:  
 Our national story has been, and still is, the envy of the world. Indeed, the death of Osama bin Laden 
 after a decade-long manhunt by the United States reminded us earlier this month that, as President 
 Obama said, when faced with tough times ‘we do not falter’.147 
 
First, then, bin Laden’s death was proof that “America does not forget; America will ensure 
that justice is done”.148 Second, beyond accounting for bin Laden’s ultimate defeat, identity-
premised narrations also helped to explain the manner of the operation’s prosecution: his 
body was treated with respect, for instance, “because that’s who we are” and “we feel very 
comfortable with the fact”.149 Third, the scripting of (an exceptional) American national 
identity accounted for the refusal to release post-mortem images: “That’s not who we are. We 
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!don’t trot out this stuff as trophies”.150  And, fourth, the victims of 9/11 and their families 
received particular attention in this writing, with bin Laden’s killing increasingly turned into 
a mechanism for that tragedy’s remembrance. For Obama, it “sent a signal around the world 
that we have never forgotten the extraordinary sacrifices that were made on September 
11th”.151 Although, “a moment long in coming, for the 9/11 families, for this city, and for our 
nation”152 and a “bittersweet moment…for many families of the victims”,153 bin Laden’s 
death was scripted as providing a “sense of closure”.154 And, as Obama put it, on learning of 
bin Laden’s death America(ns) “experienced the same sense of unity that prevailed on 
9/11”.155 Within this writing of identity, unity and closure, it was, therefore, entirely:  
appropriate and fitting [that the President] travel to New York…in the wake of the successful mission 
… in order to recognise the terrible loss that New York suffered on 9/11, and to acknowledge the 
burden that the families of the victims, the loved ones of the victims, have been carrying with them 
since 9/11, almost 10 years.156 
 
Framing and Forgetting 
The article’s final section now turns to remembering and forgetting - and also therefore 
continuity and discontinuity - in the writing of bin Laden’s killing. 
Remembering (and) the War on Terror 
A first point to note from the above discussion is the extent to which bin Laden’s killing 
engendered a return to core discursive themes that dominated his predecessor’s war on terror. 
The demonisation of bin Laden and his supporters, for example, via the language of terrorism 
and cowardice, was prevalent throughout the tenure of the Bush Administration.157 The 
framing of Al Qaeda’s struggle as anachronistic,158 and only contingently related to Islam,159 
were also direct continuations of earlier representations with which Americans were already 
well familiar. The writing of American violences by each of these Presidents, moreover, is 
also characterised by considerable discursive overlap: the language of justice, heroism and 
professionalism, within broader appeals to exceptionalism, being recurrent.160 
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!Although these discursive themes extend back beyond Bush’s presidency,161 they also shed 
light on the war on terror’s longevity. Their re-emergence under Obama, indeed, may indicate 
the continuing hegemony enjoyed by this discourse; one Jackson explains by its 
institutionalisation in American life and connection to longstanding political myths.162 
Alternatively, these continuities may be taken simply as further evidence of the lack of 
political or rhetorical distance between Obama and Bush in relation to the necessity of 
combating terrorism and securing the US.163 Yet, however we explain it, this writing of self 
and other in familiar and simplified language clearly contributed to more than the 
condemnation of bin Laden, the ‘terrorist’. It also, simultaneously, contributed to the 
justification of his killing and the operation from which it resulted. Discursive continuities 
with the War on Terror, in short, enabled this killing to be written as heroic and professional, 
successfully completed according to the laws of war, ethically conducted in accord with just 
war principles, and significant in the removal of an active terrorist of dubious moral worth.  
 
Forgetting (and) bin Laden’s death 
The article’s introduction included a brief overview of contemporary literatures on social, 
collective and narrative memory. In it, we noted that practices of remembrance and 
commemoration have attracted far greater attention, and are subsequently better understood, 
than dynamics of forgetting. Part of the reason for this relates, simply, to the challenges of 
identifying and accessing the forgotten given its status as partial or total absence.164 At the 
same time, this forgetting of forgetting might also have something to do with the widespread 
valorisation of remembrance, and concomitant view of forgetting as failing, negation or loss 
in everyday and scholarly usage.165  
In spite of these challenges - methodological and normative – an important and growing body 
of literature on the processes of forgetting is now beginning to emerge. Although diverse, two 
primary insights for this article emerge from this work. First, forgetting is itself shorthand for 
a large range of practices. There are different types of forgetting, which take place in 
different sites and locations, by different agents. Connerton, for instance, identifies seven 
forms of forgetting, spanning the repressive and forceful erasure of memories, through to 
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!tacit, shared silences about difficult pasts.166 Gregory’s concept of ‘colonial amnesia’ offers 
an alternative framework, and one that connects to this article’s normative concern in 
countering amnesiac histories of violence.167 Colonial amnesia is, in part, shorthand for 
processes of narrative forgetting that enable and legitimise imperial violence.  To forget is to 
make history, which, too often, serves as a platform for present and future liberal violences. 
Second, this literature also usefully demonstrates that the drivers of forgetting are multiple 
and complex. On the one hand, forgetting occurs as a necessary response to the limits of 
human cognition, and to the need for simplification in order to narrate, remember, or 
otherwise make sense of the past.168 As Ricoeur argues, “we cannot tell a story without 
eliminating or dropping some important event according to the kind of plot we intend to 
build.”169 At the same time, because forgetting is an inherently social phenomenon (as is 
memory), what can be forgotten will be constrained by social contexts, conventions, 
commemorative forms, political interests and the like. Thus, while, “the ability to remember, 
to speak of or to commemorate one thing may implicitly be predicated on the ability to keep 
silent on others…many of these silences and exclusions are far from benign and often reflect 
real desires to mute certain aspects of the past”.170 Here, the political imperative to ‘never 
forget’ 9/11 is intimately connected to the narrative forgetting of the less sanguine facts of the 
War on Terror’s prosecution, such as the murky legal circumstances of bin Laden’s death.  
In the context of bin Laden’s death, at least two types of forgetting may be identified, each of 
which emerged within the short period after those events with which we are here concerned. 
The first concerns what Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger term ‘covert silences’: those 
mechanisms that work to de-emphasise, distract from or diminish the importance of aspects 
of that which is being remembered.171 This type of forgetting involves pushing uncomfortable 
or less palatable aspects of a past event ‘into the margins’; not as an exercise in outright 
denial, but rather, as a way of de-emphasising through highlighting the wider importance of 
an unfolding story. Two instances of this type of forgetting have been explored in this article. 
The first concerns the event of bin Laden’s death and the gradual anaesthetisation of the 
language employed in its recounting. Although initially framed in descriptive, corporeal ways, 
‘dead’ and ‘killed’ gradually became ‘lost’, ‘removed’ and ‘gone’. His death, in other words, 
became increasingly alluded to, and therefore acknowledged only implicitly. The second 
example concerns questions of agency in relation to bin Laden’s killing. Here, an initial 
claiming of responsibility, even early triumphalism, was gradually re-narrated in such a way 
that worked to remove his death’s protaganists from the events. Indeed, the actions of the US 
military machine became discussed, far more frequently, in terms of its treatment of bin 
Laden’s (dead) body than in its role in engendering the need for a burial. Again, though, this 
was not a complete denial: the diegetic conditions of this story’s telling such as its narrators 
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!and sites contained within them an implicit acknowledgement of responsibility. But, it was 
another example of de-amplification or forgetting through covert silences: an allusion to what 
had taken place, but one lacking any explicit engagement therein. 
These types of silence both sat alongside and were gradually replaced by a second style of 
forgetting described by Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger: forgetting via overt silences.172 Where 
covert silences work primarily through de-emphasis, overt silences refer to those aspects of a 
past entirely unmentioned. A number of aspects of bin Laden’s death may fit into this notion. 
Most obviously - and reproducing silences of the earlier war on terror - there was no explicit 
discussion here of bin Laden’s ambitions and politics, including the motivations behind his 
campaign against the ‘far enemy’ of the United States and its allies.173 Absent, too, was any 
sustained engagement with the more ‘robust’ intelligence techniques that may have 
contributed to his killing. Perhaps more interesting, though, is the gradual writing out of bin 
Laden himself from this narrative as attention turned to the significance of his killing: 
whether in terms of (inter)national security or US identity. Although his death functions as a 
point of departure for those projected futures, its significance as an event became increasingly 
diminished as events yet to arrive increasingly took centre stage. 
 
Conclusion 
This gradual forgetting of the operation’s target may be seen, simply, as a continuation of a 
discursive process in place since 9/11. As the ‘failure’ to capture or kill bin Laden stretched 
into months and years, the ‘war on terror’ had been increasingly framed around 
accomplishments and goals stretching far beyond this one individual.174 In this process, 
Osama bin Laden had, perhaps, already begun to decrease in importance: never completely 
forgotten, but also never a yardstick by which to judge the successes of this conflict’s 
prosecution. Alternatively we might approach this forgetting as a product of a political desire 
to capitalise on this event’s patriotic potentialities by returning to the memory of 9/11 and its 
victims. More prosaically, perhaps bin Laden’s death was simply overtaken by events. The 
Arab Spring dominated much of the White House’s attention throughout 2011, both prior to 
and after bin Laden’s death. The planned withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, too, was 
central within political discourse at the time, as were the economic travails confronted by the 
US. In this sense, perhaps ‘business as usual’ simply intruded on the (re)telling of this story 
over time. As Jay Carney recounted on 9 May:  
on the Monday after Osama bin Laden was eliminated, we had a meeting I was in that was policy-
focused on a non-national security issue for 90 minutes with the President, and bin Laden was never 
mentioned - less than 24 hours after the event.175 
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!However understood, these instances of covert and overt forgetting have important 
implications for the prosecution of the War on Terror and liberal violence more generally. 
They worked to augment the legitimacy of the killing of Osama bin Laden through the 
forgetting of those details and narratives that might highlight the murky legal and moral basis 
for an operation that, at its crux, amounted to the extra-judicial assassination of multiple 
unarmed and lightly-armed persons, in the sovereign territory of an uniformed ally. An 
operation with considerable questions around its legality, appropriateness and ethicality was 
gradually re-written in a manner that de-emphasised and excluded its more controversial 
moments. In this sense, these instances of narrative forgetting appear intimately related to the 
revisiting of the war on terror’s moral certainties, adding, in the process, to this event’s 
justification. As Gregory has argued, it is important to resist urges to “gloss over the terrible 
violence”.176 If “we do not successfully contest these amnesiac histories” they, and we, 
support the prosecution of liberal, and imperial, violences.177 This article, then, offers one 
attempt to resist such instances of “studious disregard” by revealing those practices of 
narrative forgetting that help to make such violences possible.178 
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